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Impact of external knowledge acquisition strategies on 
innovation – A comparative study based on Dutch and 
Swiss panel data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
There is growing evidence that firms increasingly adopt open innovation practices. In this 
paper we investigate the impact of two such external knowledge acquisition strategies, ‘buy’ 
and ‘cooperate’, on firm’s product innovation performance. Taking a direct (productivity) 
approach, we test for complementarity effects in the simultaneous use of the two strategies, 
and in the intensity of their use. Our results based on large panels of Dutch and Swiss 
innovating firms, suggest that while both ‘buy’ and ‘cooperate’ have a positive effect on 
innovation, there is little statistical evidence that using them simultaneously leads to higher 
innovation performance.  Results from the Dutch sample provide some indication, that there 
are positive economies of scope in doing external and cooperative R&D simultaneously 
conditional on doing internal R&D.  
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INTRODUCTION 
This is a paper on the impact of external knowledge acquisition strategies on innovation 
performance and is mainly motivated by the observation of the necessity of the acquisition of 
new knowledge as a precondition for successful innovative activities of enterprises. New 
knowledge is generated not only inside the boundaries of a firm but also acquired from the 
environment. Even the largest and most technologically self-sufficient enterprises require 
knowledge from beyond the firm boundaries. In addition to own research and development 
(internal R&D) enterprises typically are engaged in the trading of knowledge on the 
technology market (contract or external R&D) and/or co-operate actively – formally or 
informally – with other firms and research institutions. For applied industrial economics it is 
an important task understanding how firms integrate internal knowledge and various types of 
externally acquired knowledge and if such activities increase firms’ performance. In the last 
years there is an increasing interest in economic literature to analyse the influence of 
alternative knowledge acquisition strategies on firm performance (see, Cassiman and 
Veugelers 2006; Belderbos et al. 2006 for two important papers on this topic). An important 
motive for this research interest is the improvement of our understanding of the role of such 
strategies with respect to the innovation performance and the output performance of 
enterprises that engage in such strategies. Better insights into knowledge acquisition strategies 
and their impact on firm performance would allow the formulation of a knowledge-based 
technology policy. 
We focus in the paper at hand on two knowledge acquisition strategies: external or contract 
R&D and R&D (innovation) co-operation. Both strategies indicate a tendency to open the 
innovation process (“open innovation”; see, e.g., Laursen and Salter 2006); however they are 
not identical with respect to the appropriability implications. When the buy strategy is used 
firms are obviously not interested in protecting the R&D (innovation) outcomes from 
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competitors or keeping them secret from them. The appropriability requirements are much 
more severe in case of cooperative projects (“coop strategy”), in which (sharing of) property 
rights (is) are properly arranged, even if they cannot be as exclusive as for in-house R&D 
(innovation) (“make strategy”). In this sense the “buy” (contract R&D) and “coop strategy” 
could be used alternatively. It is then interesting, also for policy, to know, if firms use them 
alternatively or complementarily to benefit from the combined use of both types of external 
knowledge acquisition. 
Why a comparative study? There are two main arguments for justifying that choice: first, 
comparative studies help to test the validity and robustness of theoretical notions about the 
relationship of different strategies of knowledge acquisition and their (combined) impact on 
innovation performance on a broader basis and, second, serve to investigate the relative 
importance or effectiveness of knowledge acquisition strategies with respect to innovativeness 
in different countries as basis for evidence-based policy. 
Why a comparative study of the Netherlands and Switzerland? It is interesting to investigate 
the impact of knowledge acquisition strategies on innovation performance for two countries 
that show several similarities (small, open economies, technologically advanced – near the 
“technological frontier”; Switzerland: “innovation leader”; Netherlands: “innovation 
follower” according to EIS (European Innovation Scoreboard) 2008 assessment) and at the 
same time differences that might be relevant for the outcomes of knowledge acquisition 
strategies: EU membership; more active innovation policy in the Netherlands, e.g., more 
public support of corporate R&D (almost non-existing in Switzerland) and R&D (innovation) 
cooperation.    
What is the originality of this study? First, the investigation of the impact of the external 
R&D and R&D (innovation) co-operation as well as the combined effect of these two 
strategies based both on qualitative and quantitative variables that measure the two strategies 
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and separately for manufacturing and services using three cross-sections of firm data for both 
countries and, second, the comparison of two technologically advanced European countries 
with different innovation policies that might influence corporate strategies of knowledge 
acquisition. 
Informed by the growing literature on open innovation (Chesbrough, 2003; Dahlander and 
Gann, 2010; Drechsler, and Natter, 2012; Fey and Birkinshaw, 2005), we expected that the 
more firms rely on different external knowledge sourcing modes, the better they would 
perform in terms of innovation. While we find some evidence that both external technology 
sourcing and R&D cooperation positively impact innovation in isolation, we hardly find 
evidence of an additional gain in performance when both are used simultaneously. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: in section 2 we discuss briefly related empirical 
literature. Section 3 presents the model specification. Section 4 deals with the data. In section 
5 we discuss the method and present the results. Finally, section 6 concludes.    
 
2. REVIEW OF RELATED EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
We concentrate here on the line of empirical research on knowledge acquisitions strategies 
that emphasize the performance implications of external knowledge sourcing, particularly the 
possible complementarity of such strategies, i.e. the mutual strengthening with respect to 
economic performance. Studies in this line investigate the impact on innovation performance 
as well as on economic performance in the narrow sense, e.g. labour productivity. 
Beneito (2006) investigated based on longitudinal data of Spanish firms mainly two 
hypotheses: (a) in-house R&D activities are more productive in terms of significant 
innovations leading to patents than contract R&D, which, in turn, is more productive than 
internal R&D in terms of incremental innovations (utility models); (b) the composition of 
total R&D investment matters. The analysis confirms both hypotheses. Thus, in-house and 
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contract R&D show different effects on innovation performance. Contract R&D has to be 
combined with in-house R&D in order to contribute effectively to more significant 
innovations. Both together lead to economically more valuable results. 
Analysing a sample of Belgian manufacturing firms Cincera et al. (2003) found that besides 
internal R&D co-operation with foreign partners, particularly, customers, foreign suppliers or 
other foreign companies seems to stimulate significantly firm productivity growth. In contrast, 
R&D co-operation with Belgian partners is associated with low productivity growth. 
Peeters and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2006) could confirm in a study with data of 
Belgian firms the results of Beneito (2006) (see above) regarding the higher productivity of 
in-house R&D with respect to patents in comparison to contract R&D. They found that the 
choice of a specific innovation strategy is more important than other firm or sector 
characteristics for explaining patent activities. Especially R&D co-operation with external 
partners enhances patent activities of firms. Furthermore, firms focussing on process 
innovation are less likely to have patents than product-oriented innovating firms. 
Cassiman and Veugelers (2006) investigated based on Belgian manufacturing firm data in 
their pioneering work on “complementarity in innovation strategy” the main drivers for 
internal (“make”) and/or external (“buy”, co-operation) knowledge acquisition strategies. In 
addition, they analysed the impact of different knowledge strategies on product innovation 
performance. By applying several econometric estimation methods the authors found that 
there exists complementarity between the strategies “make” and “buy”. External knowledge 
shows the greatest positive impact on the innovation performance of a firm only when it is 
combined with internal R&D activities. Rather surprisingly R&D co-operation does not show 
the expected significant positive effect.  
Belderbos et al. (2004) analysed the impact of R&D co-operation on firm performance 
differentiating between four types of R&D partners (competitors, suppliers, customers as well 
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as universities and research institutions), and considering two performance measures: labour 
productivity and productivity with respect to sales of innovative products. The data came 
from a sample of Dutch firms. Competitor and supplier co-operation focus on incremental 
innovations that improve labour productivity. University co-operation enhance particularly 
productivity with respect to sales of innovative products. Furthermore, customers and 
universities are important sources of knowledge for firms pursuing radical innovations that 
facilitate growth of sales innovative products in the absence of formal R&D co-operation. 
Belderbos et al. (2006) assessed the performance effects of simultaneous engagement in R&D 
co-operation with different partners (competitors, clients, suppliers, and universities and 
research institutions). They tested whether these different types of R&D co-operation are 
complements in improving labour productivity. According to the results customer co-
operation helps to increase market acceptance and diffusion of product innovation and 
enhances the impact of competitor and university co-operation. Smaller firms face 
diseconomies in pursuing multiple R&D co-operation strategies, which may stem from higher 
costs of simultaneously managing several partnerships. The study is based on data of Dutch 
firms from two surveys conducted in 1996 and 1998. 
Lokshin et al. (2008) examined the impact of internal and external R&D on labour 
productivity in a 6-year panel of Dutch manufacturing firms and found complementarity 
between internal and external R&D, with a positive effect of external R&D evident only in 
case of sufficient internal R&D. Hagedoorn and Wang (2012) examined complementarity 
between internal and external R&D in pharmaceutical firms between 1986 and 2000. External 
R&D was based on R&D alliance or R&D acquisition. They found that complementarity 
depends on the level of internal R&D: at high levels internal and external R&D are 
complements, at low levels they are substitutes. 
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Grimpe and Hussinger (2008) investigated the complementarity effects of formal and 
informal technology transfer from Academia to Industry with respect to innovation 
performance. The analysis was based on a dataset of more than 2000 German firms. The 
results based on direct and indirect complementarity tests showed a complementarity 
relationship between informal and formal technology transfer.  
In a further study based on data from the German part of the Community Innovation Survey 
(CIS3) Schmiedeberg (2008) provided evidence for significant complementarities between 
internal and R&D cooperation, but no complementarity between internal and R&D co-
operation.  
Focusing on industrial research laboratories in the USA, Adams and Marcu (2004) found that 
R&D sourcing is mainly driven by research joint ventures with federal government 
institutions. Sourcing saves R&D costs and secures access to technical services, but it does 
not affect innovation performance as measured by patents and new products. In contrast, 
internal research and research joint ventures increase innovation output. 
With one exception (Cassiman and Veugelers 2006), all other reviewed studies investigated 
primarily complementarities between in-house R&D and external (contract) R&D but not 
between the external knowledge acquisition strategies (co-operation; external R&D), which is 
the main subject of this study. The findings vary not only by country of origin of the 
investigated corporates but also by the size of the firm samples that are used for the analysis, 
the target performance indicators and the reference period of the data. Most studies applied 
the direct method of testing complementarity, often based on the super-modularity condition 
for two activities (see Milgrom and Roberts 1990). 
       
3. MODEL SPECIFICATION 
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Our interest here is not so much to re-address the complementarity between make and buy 
(Bönte, 2003; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Hagedoorn and Wang, 2012; Lokshin et al., 
2008), but rather to examine a possible complementarity between two external knowledge 
acquisition strategies: external R&D (BUY) and cooperation (COOP). External R&D 
corresponds to arm’s length technology acquisition, i.e. through subcontracting and 
outsourcing. Collaboration refers to joint efforts, with risk-sharing, cost-sharing and 
knowledge-sharing. Hence the question is whether it pays to collaborate in addition to 
outsourcing or to outsource in addition to collaborating. We limit ourselves to firms that do 
internal R&D, as the question is not very relevant for firms that have no internal R&D activity 
at all.  
In the Swiss innovation survey questionnaire there is no overlap between external R&D and 
cooperation, the former being essentially composed of R&D contracts, the latter excluding 
those contracts, and cooperation is restricted to R&D. In the Dutch CIS survey, external R&D 
does not exclude collaborative R&D, and cooperation pertains to the whole spectrum of 
innovation activities, not just to R&D. By concentrating on firms that do internal R&D, we 
minimize this difference in the definition of cooperation between the two countries.  
We shall assess the existence and the extent of complementarity using the productivity 
approach and not the correlation approach, respectively PROD and CORR as Athey and Stern 
(1998) called them. The correlation approach verifies whether two strategies are adopted 
jointly after controlling for some other common determinants, the productivity approach tests 
whether the use of both strategies leads to a higher level of economic performance. It seems to 
us that the latter approach is more powerful as it tests directly the efficiency of using both 
strategies whereas the former tests only whether they are adopted jointly for reasons that 
cannot otherwise be explained. We shall first test whether doing both external R&D and 
collaborating leads to higher economic performance, i.e. we use only qualitative information 
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on BUY and COOP and test complementarity using the notion of supermodularity (Milgrom 
and Roberts, 1990). Because of the potential overlap between external R&D and cooperation 
in the Dutch data, we then also analyse the complementarity on the basis of quantitative data, 
namely the amount of external R&D expenditure (as a share of sales) and the number of 
cooperation partners. Complementarity between two strategies then means that the marginal 
return of one strategy increases with the amount of the other strategy, where the return is 
defined in terms of some kind of payoff function. We have chosen as the payoff function the 
amount of product innovation, which is defined as the share in total sales due to new-to-the-
firm or essentially improved products (in short, the share of innovative sales). To capture the 
complementarity effect, we include an interaction term of external R&D and number of 
cooperation partners.   
We log-transform the share of innovative sales (ݕ௜௧) and make it depend in a linear fashion on 
the external knowledge acquisition strategies ሺݔ௜௧ଵ ሻ while controlling for other determinants of 
innovation output ሺݔ௜௧ଶ ሻ. Formally, we have 
 
(1)  ln ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵݔ௜௧ଵ ൅ ߚଶݔ௜௧ଶ ൅ ݑ௜ ൅ ߝ௜௧  
 
where the error term has two independent components, one firm-specific, ݑ௜, that is assumed 
to be normally distributed with mean 0 and variance ߪ௨ଶ, and one idiosyncratic, ߝ௜௧, that is 
assumed to be normally distributed with mean 0 and variance ߪఌଶ. By allowing for an 
individual effect that is generated by a certain distribution (the random effect specification in 
panel data), we control for unobserved individual-specific determinants, which might affect 
the parameter estimates. The individual random effect is not correlated with the exogenous 
control variables ሺݔ௜௧ଶ ሻ, but might be correlated with the strategy variables ሺݔ௜௧ଵ ሻ. Therefore we 
resort to an instrumental variables estimator, where we project the dependent variable and the 
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explanatory variables on the exogenous variables of the model and a set of excluded 
instruments, i.e. not appearing in (1) as explanatory variables. We have decided to control for 
individual heterogeneity through a random effect rather than a fixed effect for three reasons: it 
allows us to keep enterprises with only one observation, it keeps time-invariant variables, and 
it does not suffer from the incidental parameters problem. 
For the reasons indicated above, we run (1) only on firms with R&D. Since not all innovators 
are internal R&D performers, it is necessary to correct for this selection bias. To this end,  we 
follow the Heckman two-step procedure, i.e. we first run a probit (on the logarithmic 
transformations of firm size and the age of the firm, the obstacle “innovation costs”, and 
foreign-owned firms as well as industry and time dummies for Switzerland, and on firm size, 
age and locational dummies according to the Dutch provinces, as well as industry and time 
dummies for the Netherlands) to select the firms that perform  internal R&D and derive from 
it an inverse Mill’s ratio (IMR), which we then introduce in equation (1) besides ݔ௜௧ଵ  and  ݔ௜௧ଶ . 
Whereas with the qualitative variables for BUY and COOP, internal R&D (MAKE) serves as 
the reference category, in the version with quantitative variables we must also control for the 
amount of internal R&D. Indeed, we can no longer ignore the fact that doing more internal 
R&D may also influence the share of innovative sales. Actually ignoring the possible effect of 
internal R&D may constitute a serious variable omission bias. Moreover, if we assume that 
firms maximize their performance by choosing their strategies appropriately, hence maximize 
w/t internal R&D, external R&D and number of cooperating partners, then, by the second-
order conditions, the Hessian should be negative definite. If we exclude the own squared 
terms and only include the interaction terms, then the second principal minor will always have 
the wrong sign. Therefore, it is important to include the own squared terms in addition to the 
interaction terms. 
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Some firms may have no external R&D or no cooperation partners. To avoid having zeros, we 
increase all values of external R&D and number of cooperation partners by one (one thousand 
actually in the case of external R&D whose units are in thousands). These small changes 
should only slightly affect their marginal effects that will later be calculated. 
We estimate (1) separately for the Dutch and Swiss firms, since in any case we are not 
allowed for reasons of statistical confidentiality to merge and share the data, but also because 
the coefficients in (1) might not be the same in the two countries and because the available 
variables that we want to control for are sometimes measured differently in the two countries. 
  
 
4. DATA 
In Switzerland and in the Netherlands innovation surveys have been conducted for a number 
of years so that panel data can be used to control for individual effects that might plague the 
conclusions regarding complementarity between cooperation strategies (Miravete and Pernías, 
2006). For Switzerland we rely on the waves pertaining to the years 1997-1999, 2000-2002 
and 2003-2005 (where the level observations, like the share of innovative sales, pertain to the 
years 1998, 2001 and 2004), and for the Netherlands on the waves pertaining to the years 
1998-2000, 2000-2002 and 2002-2004 (where the level observations pertain to the years 
2000, 2002 and 2004). From the three waves we construct an unbalanced panel of enterprises 
in manufacturing and in services. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 
 
In table 1 we present the definitions and abbreviations of the variables that we shall use in our 
econometric analysis. Internal R&D, external R&D and sales of new products are normalized 
by total sales. Cooperation is measured by the number of cooperation partners. As already 
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indicated in the previous section, we try to control for the same variables in the two countries, 
but some of them are measured differently, in particular regarding the number of cooperation 
partners and incoming knowledge spillovers. Moreover for the Netherlands we do not have a 
good measure for competition, the evolution of demand and technological potential. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 
 
 
In table 2 we compare the frequencies of technology acquisition strategies for internal R&D 
performers between Switzerland and the Netherlands, in manufacturing and in services. The 
column sums of table 2 add up to 100%. In manufacturing, the proportion of firms that rely 
only on internal R&D is 33% higher in Switzerland than in the Netherlands, the proportions 
of firms that rely on internal R&D and external R&D or on internal R&D and R&D 
cooperation is pretty similar in the two countries, and the proportion of firms that use all three 
sources of knowledge acquisition is 24% in Switzerland compared to 30% in the Netherlands. 
In services, the difference is more pronounced: in Switzerland more than twice as many firms 
rely on internal R&D only, almost twice as many rely on internal R&D plus cooperation and 
one third of them rely less on internal R&D combined with either external R&D or with 
external R&D and cooperation, compared to the Dutch firms. Thus, in general the observed 
frequencies reveal that the Dutch firms favour open innovation more than the Swiss firms. 
The fact that a higher proportion of Dutch firms practice all three types of knowledge 
acquisition could in part be due to a less clearer definitional separation of external R&D and 
cooperation. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 
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In table 3 we present some descriptive statistics about the quantitative variables introduced in 
the analysis and the instrumental variables, again separately for manufacturing and for 
services. We notice that the average share of innovative sales is slightly higher in Switzerland 
(36% versus 31% in manufacturing and 27% versus 23% in services). In accordance with 
table 2, the intensity of internal R&D is substantially higher in Switzerland than in the 
Netherlands and in both countries higher in services than in manufacturing. In contrast, the 
intensity of external R&D is substantially higher in the Netherlands compared to Switzerland. 
Dutch firms spend on average three times as much as Swiss firms on external R&D in 
manufacturing and four times as much in services. The number of partnerships is about the 
same in the two countries if we normalize them by the maximum number of possible 
partnerships, which is almost twice as high in the Netherlands as in Switzerland. In the Dutch 
sample there are about twice as many MNEs as in Switzerland in manufacturing and three 
times as many in services, which could in part explain the difference in the amount of external 
R&D (R&D performed by a subsidiary of the MNE is internal to the MNE, but here it is 
considered as external to the firm). The average Dutch firm is younger and slightly larger than 
the average Swiss firm, both in manufacturing and in services. The choice of excluded 
instruments used to correct for the endogeneity of technology acquisition strategies is country 
specific. 
 
 
5. RESULTS 
In Tables 4 and 5 we report the estimation results for the specification with qualitative 
variables for technology acquisitions, for manufacturing and services respectively. We present 
two sets of estimates: in column I the estimates where the strategies are considered as 
exogenous, in column II those where instrumental variables are used because the strategies 
are considered as endogenous. We also control for time and industry dummies but do not 
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report the corresponding coefficients. For column II, we use the following excluded 
instruments:  Educ, Hamp, Spil, Gp, and province dummies for the Netherlands, and Demand, 
Hper, Tp, IPC, and Spil1 for Switzerland.1 The instruments pass various tests of weakness: 
the Hansen test does not reject the hypothesis of overidentification restrictions, the Kleinberg-
Paap test of the null hypothesis of underidentification is rejected everywhere, except for 
services in the Netherlands.2 In addition, the p-values of the F-statistics of the first-stage 
regressions are close to zero. 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 
 
Since the strategies are measured as exclusive dummies (as in Table 2), with doing internal 
R&D only is the reference category, the test of complementarity consists in checking where 
the coefficient of the dummy indicating the use of all three strategies (internal, external and 
cooperative R&D) is larger than the sum of the coefficients of internal, external R&D & 
internal R&D and cooperation combination strategies. Although the interaction term is always 
significant (and often the only significant coefficient) in both countries we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis of no difference between the coefficients in line 3 and the sum of the 
coefficients in line 1 and 2. The reported p-values of the null hypothesis of no 
complementarity are all larger than 0.05. Instrumenting the knowledge acquisition strategies 
yields less precise estimators and does not lead to significantly different results. 
                                                 
1 Hamp is the sum of the scores on the bottlenecks (Hcos, Hper, Hfin and Hdem) reported in Table 1. The mean 
of this variable is 3.09 (sd. 2.90) in the services sub-sample and 2.38 (sd 2.80) in the manufacturing sub-sample. 
2 We estimated the IV models without individual effects and then with the individual effects – the former 
allowing us to do the tests regarding the quality of the instruments, the latter giving us estimates of the individual 
effects. 
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The intensity of product innovation is not significantly related to the size of the firm, and if it 
is, it is negatively related to size. This is a classic result, which can easily be explained by the 
fact that innovative sales increase with additional innovation input but less than the total sales 
of the firm.  Younger enterprises are more innovative (cf. Schneider and Veugelers, 2010) 
while foreign MNEs in our samples are not necessarily different from domestic firms when it 
comes to innovation intensity (cf. Belderbos et al, 2004; Dachs et al., 2008). The idiosyncratic 
component of the error term has a higher variance than the individual component. The 
insignificant inverse Mills ratio indicates that there is no systematic selection bias in 
examining only product innovators among the innovating firms. 
 
INSERT TABLE 6 
 
In Table 6 we tabulate the estimation results of an error component model with individual 
random effects, where quantitative measures of the three sources of technology acquisition are 
introduced in linear, squared and interaction terms, and, as before, size, MNEs, age, the 
inverse Mills ratio, time and province dummies are controlled for. The control variables have 
the same effects as in the specification with qualitative variables of technology acquisition. 
We shall concentrate on the seven coefficients pertaining to the technology acquisition 
variables. Although we recognize that these variables may be endogenous, we have too few 
good instruments to control for the endogeneity of those seven corresponding variables. 
Moreover, the results of Tables 4 and Table 5 seem to indicate that the results of IV 
regressions do not depart too much from those obtained without instrumenting. When we tried 
to estimate by IV using our small number of poor instruments, nothing became significant.  
Overall, the results suggest that there are diseconomies of scale in both internal R&D and in 
external technology acquisition with the square terms of both R&D terms negative and 
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significant in the Dutch data while in the Swiss sample the square terms on external 
technology acquisition terms are insignificant. The square term of the cooperation variable is 
not statistically significant in the Dutch sample, while it is positive and significant for Swiss 
manufacturing firms. Most of the interactions effects are not statistically significant. 
Conditional on performing internal R&D, the complementarity between Buy and Coop is 
given by the sum of the coefficients of the interaction terms of Buy&Coop and 
Buy&Make&Coop. This sum is positive in all cases suggesting at least that there are positive 
economies of scope in doing external and cooperative R&D together. However, we can 
conclude on the basis of these data and this model to the existence of complementarity 
between the two sources of open innovation only in the case of manufacturing in the 
Netherlands. 
 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Whereas prior studies have either examined the complementarity of ‘make’ and ‘buy’, or the 
complementarity in different types of R&D collaboration, this study examines the 
complementarity between ‘buy’ and ‘cooperate’ in the presence of internal R&D. We 
compare the performance of firms that are only engaged in external technology sourcing, or 
only in cooperative R&D (with suppliers, customers, competitors and research institutions) 
and those that combine those two open innovation strategies. Using panel data on a large set 
of Swiss and Dutch innovating firms, we examine whether the two open innovation strategies 
are complementary in fostering firm innovation.  
Informed by the growing literature on open innovation,  we expected that the more firms rely 
on different external knowledge sourcing modes, the better they would perform in terms of 
innovation. While we find some evidence that both external technology sourcing and R&D 
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cooperation positively impact innovation in isolation, we hardly find evidence of an additional 
gain in performance when both are used simultaneously. 
There are a number of possible ways to improve the specification, which we leave for future 
research. First, our measure of cooperation is rather crude, as we aggregate different types of 
partners (vertical, competitors, universities and research institutes) into one measure. There is 
some initial evidence that collaborative R&D projects between competitors are different from 
collaborative projects with other types of partners, as they are broader in scope and require 
less complementary, simultaneous research and development efforts from other external 
sources (Belderbos et al. 2012). This is one possible explanation for our difficulty in finding 
complementarity between ‘buy’ and ‘cooperation’ strategies. Another possibility is to also 
check for complementarity in terms of other objective functions. One payoff function could 
be innovation in general, including all dimensions of innovation (such as process innovation, 
unsuccessful or uncompleted innovations). The problem here is that we have no observations 
on R&D for non-innovators. Another performance criterion could be process innovation 
instead of product innovation, but then we could only use qualitative variables. A more 
economic performance criterion would be labour productivity, but in addition to data on 
capital stock, we might want to allow for some lag between the time choices are made about 
the way of acquiring technological knowledge and the time knowledge shows up in 
productivity figures, hence we would require one or two more waves of innovation surveys.  
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Table 1. Construction of variables   
 
Variable name Definition 
  
 Dependent variable  
New sales (Newsales) Share in total sales of new (or essentially modified)-to-firm products , in % 
 Independent variables  
Make (Make) Total intra-mural R&D expenditures, in 1000 Euros for the Netherlands, CHF 
for Switzerland, divided by sales, in % 
Buy (Buy) Total external R&D expenditures, in 1000 Euros for the Netherlands, CHF for 
Switzerland, divided by sales, in % 
Cooperation  (Coop) A count of number of technology partnerships a firm reported engagement in 
(both domestically and internationally) with customers, suppliers, competitors, 
universities, research institutes, commercial labs, consultants, other enterprises 
within a group. For Switzerland the maximum number of technology partners 
is 13, in the Netherlands it is 25. 
MNE  (MNE) 1 if the headquarters of the firm are located outside the 
Netherlands/Switzerland, else 0 
Age  (Age) Logarithm of number of years a firm exists 
Firm size  (Size) Logarithm of number of employees 
 (Excluded) Instruments  
Incoming knowledge flows 
from industry & non-industry 
partners and incoming 
knowledge flows from public 
sources;   
for the Netherlands (Spil)  
for Switzerland (Spil1) 
 
NL: Sum of scores of importance of information received from customers, 
suppliers, competitors for firm’s innovative activities divided by the sum of 
scores of importance of information received from patents, conferences, and 
publications competitors for firm’s innovative activities 
CH: Firms were asked to assess the importance of information received from 
competitors (Spil1) on a 5-point Likert scale  
R&D researchers (Educ) NL: Share of researchers and research assistants in total R&D employees 
Part of a group (Gp) NL: 1 if the enterprise is part of a larger group 
Organizational constraints 
related to costs  (Hcos) 
NL: Firms were asked to assess the importance of innovation costs as a 
hampering factor to innovation (3-point Likert scale) 
Organizational constraints 
related to organization rigidities 
(Hper) 
NL: Firms were asked to assess the importance of lack of qualified staff as a 
hampering factor to innovation (3-point Likert scale).  
CH: Firms were asked to assess the importance of lack of R&D staff as a 
hampering factor to innovation (5-point Likert scale) 
Organizational constraints 
related to finance (Hfin) 
NL: Firms were asked to assess the importance of financing as a hampering 
factor to innovation (3-point Likert scale) 
Organizational constraints 
related to technology (Htec) 
NL: Firms were asked to assess the importance of lack of information on 
technology as a hampering factor to innovation (3-point Likert scale) 
Organizational constraints 
related to demand (Hdem) 
NL: Firms were asked to assess the importance of lack of information on 
markets/demand as a hampering factor to innovation (3-point Likert scale) 
Demand development 
(Demand) 
CH: Development of the demand during the last three years (5-point Likert 
scale) 
Price competition   
(IPC) 
CH: Firms were asked to assess the importance of price competition in their 
main product market (5-point Likert scale) 
Technological potential  
(Tp) 
CH: Assessment of the technological potential of the firm’s main business 
activity (5-point Likert scale) 
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Table 2. Frequency (in percentages) of technology acquisition strategies among internal 
R&D performers  
 
 Switzerland Netherlands 
 Manufact. Services Manufact. Services 
No external R&D and no cooperation 36.14 41.70 27.47 19.86 
External R&D only 29.90 27.20 32.81 43.04 
Cooperation only 9.95 11.81 9.31 6.72 
External R&D and cooperation 24.01 19.28 30.42 30.38 
 
 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable name Switzerland Netherlands 
 Manufacturing Services Manufacturing Services 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Newsales 36.17 26.31 26.90 25.16 31.24 24.73 23.40 23.56
Make 3.27 4.83 3.87 10.38 2.43 5.44 3.31 8.52
Buy 0.37 1.07 0.46 2.35 1.11 3.56 1.60 4.68
Coop 1.49 2.57 1.06 2.04 1.81 3.13 1.57 2.86
MNE 0.17 0.38 0.13 0.34 0.39 0.48 0.49 0.50
Age 3.81 0.86 3.62 0.94 3.01 0.71 2.67 0.82
Size 4.43 1.37 4.29 1.72 4.47 1.35 4.45 1.60
Spil/Spil1 (for CH) 2.80 1.12 3.08 1.12 0.32 0.42 0.35 0.47
Educ - - - - 0.53 0.24 0.44 0.29
Gp - - - - 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.50
Hcos - - - - 0.71 0.99 1.06 1.02
Hper - - 2.20 1.22 0.78 0.95 1.15 1.05
Hfin - - - - 0.72 0.98 1.04 1.08
Htec - - - - 0.54 0.77 0.73 0.88
Hdem - - - - 0.68 0.95 1.07 1.05
Demand 3.16 1.06 - - - - - -
IPC 3.99 0.97 3.88 1.05 - - - -
Tp 3.10 1.06 2.94 1.19 - - - -
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Table 4. Random-effects estimation of innovation performance with qualitative 
indicators of knowledge acquisition, Manufacturing  
 
 Switzerland The Netherlands
Model I II  I II 
                    Dependent variable: Newsales 
Buy only dummy 0.06 
(0.06) 
0.40
(1.29) 
0.17***
(0.04) 
0.23 
(0.35) 
Coop only dummy  0.03 
(0.08) 
-3.91
(3.06) 
0.20***
(0.06) 
0.51 
(0.73) 
Buy and Coop dummy 0.14** 
(0.06) 
2.57***
(0.82) 
0.26***
(0.05) 
0.77*** 
(0.23) 
Log Size 0.00 
(0.02) 
-0.16
(0.06) 
-0.02
(0.02) 
-0.07** 
(0.03) 
MNE 0.02 
(0.07) 
0.02
(0.14) 
0.01
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
Log Age -0.11*** 
(0.03) 
-0.06
(0.07) 
-0.08
(0.03) 
-0.06** 
(0.02) 
IMR 0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00
(0.01) 
0.45
(0.43) 
0.39 
(0.41) 
Intercept 3.26*** 
(0.16) 
3.74***
(0.58)
2.86***
(0.40)
2.81*** 
(0.39) 
ߪ௨ 0.56 0.88 0.55 0.46 
ߪ௘ 0.83 1.66 0.79 0.86 
Complementarity test 
(p-value) 
0.26 
(0.61) 
-1.97
(0.16)
-0.11
(0.15)
0.03 
(0.97) 
No of firms 1419 1419 2486 2486 
No of observations 2070 2070 3353 3353 
*** Indicates significance at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10% level, two-sided test. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Omitted category is doing internal R&D only (no external R&D, no cooperation). All models include year 
dummies and industry dummies ( 23 for the Netherlands and 17 for Switzerland). The following (excluded) 
instruments are used in model II for the Netherlands: Educ, Hamp, Spil, Gp, and province dummies. The 
following (excluded) instruments are used in model II for Switzerland: Demand, Tp, IPC, and Spil1. The null 
hypothesis for the complementarity test is that the coefficient of the Coop & Buy dummy (doing internal and 
external R&D and cooperating) is equal to the sum of the coefficients of the Buy only (doing internal and 
external R&D) and Coop only (doing internal R&D and cooperating) dummies. 
Model I: The dummies for Buy, Coop and Coop & Buy are not instrumented. 
Model II:  The dummies for Buy, Coop and Coop & Buy are instrumented  
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Table 5. Random-effects estimation of innovation performance with qualitative 
indicators of knowledge acquisition, Services  
 
 Switzerland The Netherlands 
Model I II I II 
                           Dependent variable: Newsales
Buy only dummy 0.05 
(0.11) 
-1.27
(1.37) 
0.18***
(0.07) 
0.45 
(0.92) 
Coop only dummy 0.14 
(0.14) 
2.31
(1.90) 
0.21*
(0.12) 
1.17 
(1.38) 
Buy and Coop dummy 0.16 
(0.12) 
1.59
(1.14) 
0.16**
(0.07) 
0.73* 
(0.44) 
Log Size -0.02 
(0.03) 
0.01
(0.06) 
-0.14***
(0.02) 
-0.19*** 
(0.02) 
MNE 0.11 
(0.13) 
0.09
(0.19) 
0.02
(0.05) 
0.02 
(0.06) 
Log Age -0.12** 
(0.05) 
-0.11
(0.08) 
-0.07*
(0.04) 
-0.06 
(0.04) 
IMR 0.18 
(0.13) 
0.26
(0.20) 
-0.09
(0.47) 
-0.12 
(0.54) 
Intercept 2.64*** 
(0.25) 
2.32***
(0.57)
3.12***
(0.32)
3.50*** 
(0.61) 
ߪ௨ 0.32 0.41 0.45 0.38 
ߪ௘ 1.05 1.37 0.90 0.99 
Complementarity test 0.02 
(0.88) 
0.04
(0.83)
-0.23*
(0.09)
-0.88 
(0.65) 
No of firms 527 527 1549 1549 
No of observations 669 669 1682 1682 
*** Indicates significance at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10% level, two-sided test. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Make Only (no Buy, no Coop). All models include year dummies and industry dummies (4 in the Netherlands 
and 8 in Switzerland). The following (excluded) instruments are used in model II for the Netherlands: Educ, 
Hamp, Spil, Gp, and province dummies. The following (excluded) instruments are used in model II for 
Switzerland: Tp, Hper, IPC, and Spil1. The null hypothesis for the complementarity test is that the coefficient of 
the Coop & Buy dummy (doing internal and external R&D and cooperating) is equal to the sum of the 
coefficients of the Buy only (doing internal and external R&D) and Coop only (doing internal R&D and 
cooperating) dummies. 
Model I: The dummies for Buy, Coop and Coop & Buy are not instrumented. 
Model II:  The dummies for Buy, Coop and Coop & Buy are instrumented  
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Table 6. Random-effects estimation of innovation performance with quantitative 
indicators of knowledge acquisition  
 
 Switzerland The Netherlands 
 Manufacturing Services 
 
Manufacturing Services
 Dependent variable: Newsales  
Make: internal R&D 
intensity 
3.99*** 
(1.23) 
3.48**
(1.43) 
6.89***
(0.69) 
5.10*** 
(0.78) 
Internal R&D intensity 
Squared 
-8.40** 
(4.27) 
-3.77**
(1.92) 
-11.21***
(2.51) 
-5.14*** 
(1.24) 
Buy: external R&D 
intensity 
4.15 
(5.90) 
6.10
(5.82) 
3.79***
(0.88) 
4.34*** 
(1.16) 
External R&D intensity 
Squared 
-51.49 
(72.14) 
-4.26
(26.96) 
-7.38**
(3.11) 
-4.20** 
(1.68) 
Coop: no of cooperation 
partners 
-0.17 
(0.12) 
0.24
(0.23) 
0.04***
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Coop Squared 0.13** 
(0.06) 
-0.11
(0.13) 
-0.00
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Buy & Make -3.31 
(34.70) 
-9.94
(28.51) 
-3.04
(5.49) 
-14.06* 
(5.42) 
Buy & Coop -4.63 
(4.87) 
-1.18
(7.69) 
-0.61***
(0.21) 
-0.09 
(0.20) 
Coop & Make 0.13 
(0.72) 
-0.05
(0.86) 
-0.06
(0.08) 
-0.07 
(0.14) 
Buy & Make & Coop 20.72 
(18.32) 
12.58
(36.85) 
1.78***
(0.54) 
1.55 
(1.37) 
Log Size  0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.02
(0.04) 
-0.01
(0.02) 
-0.14*** 
(0.02) 
MNE 0.03 
(0.07) 
0.04
(0.14) 
0.01
(0.04) 
0.04 
(0.05) 
Log Age -0.09*** 
(0.03) 
-0.10*
(0.05) 
-0.05*
(0.02) 
-0.05 
(0.03) 
IMR -0.00 
(0.00) 
0.20
(0.13) 
0.48
(0.37) 
0.09 
(0.46) 
Intercept 3.17*** 
(0.16) 
2.50***
(0.25)
2.61***
(0.38)
3.53*** 
(0.17) 
ߪ௨ 0.56 0.31 0.52
 
0.35 
ߪ௘ 0.85 1.04 0.79
 
0.92 
No of firms 1390 502 2486 1549 
No of observations 2004 637 3353 1682 
*** Indicates significance at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10% level, two-sided test. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. Random effects maximum likelihood estimator. The models for the Netherlands include 23 industry 
dummies (manufacturing subsample) and 4 service dummies (services subsample). The models for Switzerland 
include 17 industry dummies (manufacturing subsample) and 8 industry dummies (services subsample). 
 
 
24 
 
REFERENCES 
Adams, J.D. and Marcu, M. (2004). R&D sourcing, joint ventures and innovation: A multiple 
indicators approach. NBER Working Paper No. 10474, Cambridge, Mass. 
Athey, S. and Stern, S. (1998). An empirical framework for testing theories about complementarity in  
organizational design. NBER Working Paper 6600, Mass. 
Belderbos, R., Carree, M. and Lokshin, B. (2006). Complementarity in R&D co-operation strategies. 
Review of Industrial Organization, 28, 401-426. 
Belderbos, R., Carree, M. and Lokshin, B. (2004). Co-operative R&D and firm performance. Research  
Policy, 33, 1477-1492. 
Belderbos, R., Gilsing, V., Lokshin, B. (2012). Persistence of, and interrelation between horizontal 
and vertical technology alliances. Journal of Management, 38(6), 1788-1811. 
Beneito, P. (2006). The Innovative Performance of In-house and Contracted R&D in Terms of Patents 
and Utility Models. Research Policy, 35, 502-517. 
Bönte, W. (2003). R&D and productivity: internal vs. external R&D – evidence from West German 
manufacturing industries. Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 12(4), 343-360.  
Cassiman, B. and Veugelers, R. (2006). In search of complementarity in innovation strategy: Internal 
R&D, cooperation in R&D and external technology acquisition. Management Science, 52(1), 68-82. 
Chesbrough, H.W. (2003). Open Innovation: The new imperative for creating and profiting from  
technology, Boston, M.A.: Harvard Business School Press. 
Cincera, M., Lieselot, K., van Pottelsberghe, B. Veugelers, R. and Villegas Sanchez, C. (2003). 
Productivity, R&D and the role of international collaborative agreements. Brussels Economic Review / 
Cahiers Economiques de Bruxelles, 46(3), 107-140. 
Hagedoorn, J. and Wang, N. (2012). Is there complementarity or substitutability between internal and  
external R&D strategies? Research Policy, 41(6), 1072-1083. 
25 
 
Dachs, B., Ebersberger, B. and Lööf, H. (2008). The innovative performance of foreign-owned 
enterprises  in small open economies. Journal of Technology Transfer, 33, 393-406. 
Dahlander, L and Gann, D.M. (2010). How open is innovation? Research Policy, 39, 699-709.  
Drechsler, W. and Natter, M. (2012). Understanding a firm’s openness decisions in innovation. 
Journal of Business Research, 65, 438-445.  
Fey, C.F. and Birkinshaw, J. (2005). External sources of knowledge, governance mode, and R&D 
performance. Journal of Management, 31 (4), 597-621. 
Grimpe, C. and Hussinger, K. (2008). Formal and informal technology transfer from academia to 
industry: Complementary effects and innovation performance. ZEW Discussion Paper No. 08-080, 
Mannheim.  
Hagedoorn, J. and Wang N, (2012). Is there complementarity or substitutability between internal and 
external R&D strategies. Research Policy, 41(6), 1072-1083.  
Laursen, K. and Salter, A. (2006). Open for innovation: the role of openness in explaining innovation 
performance among U.K. manufacturing firms. Strategic Management Journal, 27,131-150. 
Lokshin, B., Belderbos, R., Carree, M. (2008). The productivity effects of internal and external R&D: 
Evidence from a dynamic panel data model. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 70(3), 399-
413. 
Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts (1990). The economics of modern manufacturing: Technology, strategy 
and organization. American Economic Review, 80(3), 511-528. 
Miravete, E. and J. Pernías (2006). Innovation complementarity and scale of production. Journal of 
Industrial Economics, 54, 1-29. 
 Peeters, C. and B. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2006). Innovation strategy and the patenting 
behaviour of Firms. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 16, 109-135. 
Schmiedeweg, C. (2008). Complementarities of innovation activities: An empirical analysis of the 
German manufacturing sector. Research Policy, 37, 1492-1503.  
26 
 
Schneider, C. and R. Veugelers (2010). On young highly innovative companies: why they matter and  
how (not) to policy support them. Industrial and Corporate Change, 19(4), 969-1007. 
 
 
The UNU‐MERIT WORKING Paper Series 
 
2013-01 Effects  of  innovation  on  employment  in  Latin  America  by  Gustavo  Crespi  and 
Ezequiel Tacsir 
2013-02 Revisiting the porter hypothesis: An empirical analysis of green  innovation for the 
Netherlands George van Leeuwen and Pierre Mohnen 
2013-03 Impact of external knowledge acquisition strategies on innovation ‐ A comparative 
study  based  on  Dutch  and  Swiss  panel  data  by  Spyros  Arvanitis,  Boris  Lokshin, 
Pierre Mohnen and Martin Wörter 
